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The Semblance of Ideologies and 
Scientific Theories and the 
Constitution of Facts 
Dr. Rory J. Conces 
University or Neb,aska 
AOSTRACT 
Responding to those who want to consign ideologies to the 
dustbin of history, I make what is perhaps an unexpected con­
nection between ideologies and scientific theories to ward off 
what may amount to be an assault on the former's cognitive 
value. Although there are significant differences t--etween ideo­
logies and scientific theories, particularly in terms of objectivity 
and openness to innovation, I find that they nre similar insofar 
as each is a cognitive fund which allows us to make sense of the 
world that we live in. Part of the sense-making quality of 
scientific theories is that they allow us to constitute and appre­
ciate facts about the world. In other words, the facts of science 
are theory-laden. Similarly, ideologies, such as Noam Chomsky's 
libertarian socialism or anarchism are also cognitive funds with 
sense-making qualities which Jaden facts, albeit facts of a diffe­
rent kind. More than that, however, I argue that the ability 
of ideologies to constitute and appreciate facts gives us reason 
for thinking the decline of ideologies as shapers of global polities 
to be premature. 
2 
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INTRODUCTION 
f. Some ~heorist~ believ~ that we are witnessiog the resurgence 
~ -ideologies and tdc.olog,caJ conflicts, whiJe others declare that 
istory ha.s come to au end with the triumph of liberal demo-;~:i:d :t~I. others have grown weary of ,ideologies and have 
fi O t · eir obsolescence. Indeed, a recent essay by Harvard P;~ dessor Sa?,1ue.l P. Huntington, in which he replaces the "clash 
o l eolog1es with the "clash of civilizations" as tile dominant 
flobal form of conilict, is just the latest attempt to consign ideo-
ogies to the ~ustbin of history.• If Huntington's thesis is 
cor~e~t, ideologies are no longer the prime movers of global 
politics. But does this alleged retreat from the political scene 
s~ggest that ideologies are less capable of in.fluencing bow we 
v!ev,, the world? Io sho(t, docs hi.s lh.esis have drastic implica-
tions for tile cognitive statl,lS o{ ideologies? It need not. . , 
Th~ ljt':ramre dealing with the differences between ideology 
a~d sc,e~ttfie theory is considerable. Ideologies are often asso-
cia!ed with closed, dogmatic, and in.flexible systems of mere 
~hef and falsehood, whereas scientific theories are thought to 
m~olve knowledge and truth. Although there is much to be 
said for these .characte~izations, this ideology-science antithesis 
<toes not provide us wtth an honest depiction of these concep-
tual frameworks. This is because they do not ad-;t th . bT h ·d · •= e poss1-
1 ity t at i eolog1es and scientific theories have something in 
common. ~he present paper will argue that these frameworks 
are n.ot as ~1sparate ~s i_s often thought. Jo Part One I claim 
that !deolog1es and sc1eot11ic theories have a common function . 
that is, they aUow us to make sense of the world that we live in' 
In Part Two I argue that this sense-making function is mosi 
!early demonstrated in the way that theories provide us with a 
fram<:work of understanding in order for "something" to be 
cons!Jtuted as~ fact. In the final part I claim that ideologies, 
because of thetr sense-mak,ng quality, also exhibit this consti-
t~t1onal feature, and that it is because of this kinship to facts 
t at we have reason to believe the claim that ideologies are no 
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longer shapers of global politics to be premature. 
PART 0 Nt; : fDEOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC T!;EOR.Y 
3 
It should first be noted that the concept of ideology i·s not of 
recent origin. On the contrary, the term 'ideology' was coined 
by the French post-Enlightenment theor.ist Antoine Destuft de 
Tracy. De Tracy and the other Ideologues thought that each 
person has the ability to ascertain what .is true and what is tight 
through reason and experience.2 As harmless as it ,may sound, 
this view bad profound ramifications for Freneh Society., for it 
meant a rejection of the authoritarianism of the a11cie11 regime 
as well as a call to perfect society. The method that was deve-
loped to carry out this program came to be called '· ideology," 
wliich they understood to be more of a "technique for discover-
ing truth and dissolving illusion" than a body of infallible 
philosophical and political doctrine.J In short, it was a .newly 
conceived science- the "science of ideas," and it was because 
of its role as a means of bringing about change in French society 
that ideology acquired its political character. 
Although the concept is stil l associated with politics, it uas 
undergone various shifts in meaning since its introduction in the 
eighteenth century. The changes range from the negative or 
pejorative shift sponsored most notably by Marx- a shift cont-
rasting ideology with reality and labelling it "false conscious-
ness" - to the present-day nonpejorarive concepliol1s found in 
the writings of some contemporary social scientists and philo-
sophers.• Indeed, one who rcv.icws the llteratme dealing with 
the concept of ideology may easily come away believing that 
there is no core meaning among the various conceptions- con-
ceptual anarchy at its worst ! Those who believe this a.re mis-
taken, however. A closer examination of the litetature finds 
two common elements : an ideational element, which is not 
value neut.cal, and an action-program, The conjunction of 
these elements is what J mean by ideology. 
fn saying that ideology possesses an ideational element , 1 
simply mean that ideology can be thought of ·as a set ofideas, 
the members of which are identifiable by their expression in 
certain statements. 5 Of course, not evety set of ideas ton~ti-
t utes an ideology, but only those by which 'peOple engage in the 
praciicc of public affairs. Or, as the politit:al philos1rpher 
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Martin Seliger puts it, an ideology is a set of ideas by which 
people "posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised 
social action, irrespective of whether such action aims to pre-
serve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order. "6 Its 
intim~ie association with politics, however, should not lead us 
to beheve that ideology is dissociated from the social and econo-
mic aspects of modern life. All three aspects , to be sure are 
i~tertwin~d in both domestic and foreign affairs. The mul;ipli-
city and mterrelatedness is readily seen, for instance, in Noam 
Chomsky's libertarian socialism or anarchism, an ideology in 
which the military adventurism and imperialism of the Western 
powers (including the United States) is a defining category.' 
The scope of the above conception of ideology is, however, 
so broad that some may conclude that an ideology is coexten-
sive with a political point of view, a political ou llook or a 
~ litical philosophy. Terms acquire their meaning by s~ify-
mg what does not count as such an item. Thus the term ideo-
logy must be shown not to cover everything. The political 
scientist Preston King does just that by distinguishing between 
ideology and these nther notions. In his essay "An Ideological 
Fallacy," King cites three characteristics that distinguishes ideo-
logy from these others. They are (I) integration (or coherence), 
(2) substance, and (3) orientation towards action. According 
to .King, ideology is the only one that exhibits all three charac-
teristics. 8 The others are generally weak in at least one area : 
a political point of view is not integrated into a general o ut-
look; a political outlook is more integrated than a political 
point of view, but an outlook may fail to provide the substan-
tive support for its c laims; and a political philosophy, though 
similar to ide?logy insofar as both have an explana tory function , 
differs from ideology in that the motivation for direction of 
political conduct are 1tot provided by every political philosophy, 
whereas they are a part of every ideology. The latter is an 
interesting case, since it is by venturing beyond the ideational 
clement and appealing to what is called an "action-program" 
that King distinguishes between ideology and political philo 
sophy_. And this difference becomes even more pronounced 
when we take into account the degree of commitment that is 
shown by devotees of ideologies. 
But this orientation towards action should not lead us to 
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think that the sole concern of ideology is normative in nature, 
i.e., with how the world should be. Although ideology does 
contain such an element, th.is is not its only concern. Th.e 
political theorist Willard A. Mullins writes of another concern 
in his essay " On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science" 
when he argues that ideology conceptua lizes and evaluates the 
contours of reality, not simply as it might be shaped by politi-
cally organized huma,1 beings in the histo rical process, but also 
as it exists.9 This conception of ideology reflects what the French 
sociologist Raymond Boudon has called the "modern" definition 
of ideology. It is an apt label because it reflects the recent trend 
of defining ideology in terms of meaning rather than in terms of 
truth and falsehood. IO T he French philosopher Raymond Aron 
said it best when he wrote that "political ideologies always 
combine more or less felicitously, factua l propositions and val ue 
judgements. They express an ou tlook on the world and a will-
turned towards the future. " 11 
What many call an ideology is typically one o f the " isms" 
that have flourished in the twentieth century such as liberalism, 
conservatism, socialism, and feminism. A lesser known but 
just as noteworthy " ism" of our age is libertarian socialism or 
anarchism, exemplified most notably in the work o f the American 
philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky. Perha~s n_owhere 
docs Chomsky espouse this ideology as c learly as m his essay 
"Notes o n Anarchism." Originally wriuen as the introduction 
to Daniel Guerin's Anarchism : From Theory to Practice, this 
revised version is a spirited discourse on libertarian socialism, 
which is libertarian in its opposi tion to "state intervention in 
social life" and socialist in itsopposi tion to, among other th.ings, 
the private ownership of then1eans of production.12 And yet it 
is a discuss ion of anarchism, for anarchism is nothing more than 
the amalgam of libertarian and socialist thought : 
Anarchism is necessarily anticapita list in that it "opposes 
the exploitation of man by man." But anarchis?1 a lso 
opposes "the dominion of man over man ." It rns1st th_at 
"socialism will be free or it will 1101 be at all: fo its 
recognition of this lies the genui ne and profound_ JUS!lfica-
tfon for the existence of anarchism." From tlus point of 
view, anarchism may be regarded as the libertarian wi ng 
of socialism. '3 
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These components ere the cornerstones of bis anarchist vis,011 
of a future society. ,. The libertarian component reflects the Idea 
of freedom of self-realization that is found in Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's liberal classic The Limits of State Action. rs But to 
realize one's potential as a human being, Humboldt states, one 
must be at liberty to do so. Thus "freedom is the first and 
indispensable condition which the possibility of such a develop-
ment presupposes. "'6 It is small wonder, then, that classical 
libertarian thought strongly opposes state intervention in the 
social fife of its citizens. Its concern for liberty forges a critique 
of statism, of the bureaucratic centralism and the coercive 
machinery designed to realize the state's potentia l to control or 
regulate an individual's pote ntia l. The anarchist is not, how-
ever, just a libertarian; he is a lso a socia list. As Guorin puts it, 
anarchism is rea lly a synonym for socialism. TJ1e anar-
ch.ist['s] .. . aim is to abolish the exploitation of man by 
man. Anarchism is only one of the streams of socialist 
thought, that stream whose ma in components are concern 
for liberty and haste to abolish the State." 
The key phrase here is " abolish the exploitation of man by mau," 
a clear reference to socialism. If there is a common denominator 
among socialists, it is that they expose the defective nature of 
capitalism. This critique of capitalism is most apparent when 
it comes to the issues of economic monopolies and the ownership 
of the means of production (i.e., factories, machinery and tools, 
and raw .materials). Socialists of all kinds speak of the dis-
mantling of such monopolies as well as the replacement of the 
private ownership of some or all of the means of production 
with some form of public or common ownership. 
This attack on capitalism also shows up in other important 
concerns found in socialist thought such as the wage system 
(because it alienates the worker from his labor) and the causes 
and effects of capitalist foreign economic expansion (i.e , im-
perialism and militarism). The latter is particularly important 
for Chomsky, since it is directly related to his scathing criticism 
of U.S. foreign policy. These conceros taken together thus 
represent the underpionings of Chomsky's socialist bent, and 
which allow him to give a meaningful apprehension to events in 
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. l ' y the world , events that a re related to a nation's forc,gn_po ,c · f 
Indeed if th.ere was ever a coherent and substanuve set o 
ideas (and' associated values) that could influence how peoJJe 
engage in the practice of making and implementrng pu_ ,c 
Policy it is ljbertu ian socialism. What we have here rs .8 
• · · al · I and economic system which touches upon the polrtrc , socra , d . 
aspects of life, and which attempts to provide an und~rsta:h•i:f 
of these aspects as well as to suggest a progra_m of acll~h:~ "We 
in its simplest form. might amount to ~otbrng mored Z") It 
get closer to goal w by not doing action X, Y,_ an t · ·ve 
offers a general outlook as well as support for claims tha g, 
Id M ver this system serves meaning to events in the wor , oreo , · h h
as a focal point foe the commitment of its devo t~es,_ eren t r':l;al 
such commitment may result in a less than obJectrve app 
of the events. Ye~ it does have the advantage of bei~g al>~~ 
mobilize and direct people towatd a goal, something w c 
scientific tl\eories tend not to impart. . . 
Libertarian socialism, lik~ other ideologies, can thus ~ 
summarized as ( I) a system of political ( as well as econo~rc 
~, h coherent and substantive, and social) ideas and values ww.c arc . Id 
(2) which. ~ropose some understanding ?f ma~ and his wor f 
and (3) whiclt couple this understandmg w,th a prog,C:m 0 
action to bring about the a ttainment of some group g~al. . 
What is important in this summary statement o_f rdeologyn~ 
rhat even with all the apparent di_fferences bet_w~en rdCO~~!ro:ful 
scientific theory, it is the fu1\ct1on of pr~v1d111g a m o 
apprehension or- the world that is found rn both f~amewc;;;~;· 
albeit each in their own particular way. The Amer'.c~rL p . 
sopher of science Norwood Russell Hanson, ,n wntmg about 
theories of elementary physics in Paflern of Discovery, notes that 
theories "offer an intelligible, systematic, conceptual patt~rn 
f~r the observed data".19 Tbe scientist, through the form_ulah~~ 
of theories strives to provide a conceptual pattenJ w~tch w 
allow data' to appear intelligible given the rest that ,s kno~n 
. . . I other words theories about the items under mvesugauoo. 11 · ' 
f t · aspects of the world. ltelp us to make sense o cer a,n . . ·r, theories qua cognitive 
But if we acknowledge that sc1ent~,c Id surely we must 
fun_ds are capable of making sense oft ~. wol1ru;ds also allow us 
'd I ·es qua cognitive 
also concede that , eo og1 . through which the world, 
to P(Opagate a network of meaning 
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makes sense to us. Take, for instance, Chomsky's libertarian 
socialism. His view of the world, both domestically and inter-
nationally, reflects his ideology; it predisposes him to view the 
world in certain ways by setting limits to what principles and 
interpretations of data can and cannot be accepted. His view 
on world affairs thus offors on surprises given his adoption of 
this brand of socialism. When he declares "that the United 
States has become the most aggressive power in the world , the 
greatest threat to peace, to national self-determination, and to 
international cooperation," he is reiterating the view that the 
United States is a power bent on imperialism.'° Jt is a claim 
that is consistent with his ideology, since his anti-imperialist 
stance is rooted in his endorsement of socialism and its critique 
of capitalism. There is, however, another way in which his 
ideology supports a rejection of imperialism. If we broaden 
our definition of imperialism to include the domination and 
control of the social and political life of one nation by another, 
Chomsky's libertarian persp~ctive offers ample support for a 
rejection of an imperialist foreign policy. The anarchist is not 
oaly a socialist who opposes capitalism. he is also a li bertarian 
wh:> opposes excessive state intervention in the lives of people, 
whether its own citizens or those of another state. To say as 
much, however, is to acknowledge that the thrust of the liber-
tarian element of anarchism is to rtduce or eliminate the econo-
mic, political, and social exploitation and enslavement of 
persons, thereby awakening their freedom of self-realization. It 
is small wonder, then, that Chomsky's libertarianism provides 
the foundation for his critique of American interventionism as 
a force that impedes the development of human potential. 
This does not mean, however, that ideologies and scientific 
theories are one in the same. There are significant differences. 
In theory construction, for instance, one becomes cognizant of a 
problem in need of a solution, constructs an hypothesis H that 
counts as a tentative solution, and tests H against experience via 
natural observation and experimentation. The attitude of self-
criticism and desire for objectivity are particularly strong in this 
endeavor. The scientist, in seeking to establish an hypothesis, 
does so with an eye to abaadoning it if it is deemed necessary, 
while satisfying the need for objectivity by relying on statements 
that are intersubjectively testable. As a result, scientific theories 
THE SEMBLANCE OF IDEOLOGIES AND SCIENTIFIC THEOR ' ES 9 
tend to be amenable to change. The same cannot be said of an 
ideology however. This is because an ideology's action-program 
works a~ainst self<riticism and objectivity by inducing strong 
commitments in their devotees, commitments which often.lead 
to a distortion of the c:ntours of reality. Acknowledgment of 
this is no better captured than in Edward Shil's remarks which 
contrast ideology with science : 
With reference to the cs>gnitive truthfulness of ideologies, 
it should be pointed out that no great ideology has even 
regarded the disciplined pursuit of truth_: ·by scientific pro-
cedures and in the mood characteristic of modern setence-
as part of its obligations. 
The ide,:ilogical culture ... d , es in fact often interfere 
with the attainment of truth. This is, however, a result 
of the closure of the ideological disposition to new evidence. 
and its distrust of all who do not share the same ideologi-
cal disposition. The chief source of tension between ideo-
logy and truth lies, therefore, in the concurrent _de_m~nds 
of the exponents of ideologi~.s for unity and d1sc1phned 
adherence on the part of their felbw believers. 21 
It must be reiterated, however, that while science's adherence_ to 
truth and objectivity is preferable to the false belief and subJe:-
tivity that ideology occasionally manifests, as when an 1de~logy s 
cognitive claims are refuted or supplanted by those of a sc1ent1fic 
theory, this opposition does not detract from the fact that both 
science and ideology make the world a meaningful pla~e to_ hve. 
And it is this sense-making quality that sustains the_ viabihty_ of 
ideologies even if Huntington is correct about their dechmng 
influence as sources of global conflict. 
PART Two : THEO~IES ANO F ,.crs 
J have so far sketched scientific theories and ideologies ~s 
conceptual frameworks that make sense of the world. lnasmt:ch 
as both theories and ideologies have this much in commo~ with . 
each other, though, we need to consider the rclat1o?sh1ps be-
tween theories, ideologies, and facts, particularly since ~ense-
making is linked with statements of fact. But what 1s the 
relationship between theories and -facts? To begin with, what 
are facts? · 
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. Some theorists have acknowledged so-called " brute facts"; 
that is, facts that are "hard" and " known through observation." 
Hanson says of these facts that 
they are just the things that happen ; the hard, cold, stub-
born facts, the sheer, physical, plain, and unvarnished facts, 
the observable facts out there for all of us to see, come up 
against, trip over. You know, we face the facts, collect 
them: the little, detached, lawless, particular, and indivi-
dual facts. Facts, in short, are just chunks of the material 
world; sticks, stones, boxes, and bears. " 22 
But if we take Hanson at his word, we must reject the very exis-
tence of such facts. Perhaps the most obvious criticism levelled 
against conceiving facts in this way is that it totally disregards 
the nonspatiality of facts. It is easy to imagine someone looking 
at a pile of books and then bending over to collect them, but can 
the same be said of facts? What would a " pile of facts" look 
like? 
A similar criticism is applicable to conceiving facts as situa-
tions (i.e., the circumstances of something a t a particular point 
in time). To be sure, the tension and drama of those hold up 
in Sarajevo and the surrounding countryside would be hard to 
miss for a traveller to that region of the former Yugoslavia. 
Their situation is unmistakably " tense" and " dramatic," but 
facts do not typically carry such semantic baggage. Moreover, 
one can obtain photographic documentation of the desperate 
situation of the residents of Sarajevo, but the same cannot be 
said of facts. What would it mean to photograph a fact ? But 
if facts are not objects or situations that are found in the world, 
what are they? One gets the distinct impression that philoso-
phers like Strawson and Hanson neither wish to posit facts as 
corporeal things in the world nor wish to disrupt the intimacy 
that exists between facts and the world. The move away from 
their corporeality is stressed in Strawson's assertion that facts 
arc "wedded to 'that'·clauses." Unfortunately, be obscures his 
discussion by taking refuge in talk of a fact as a "pseudo-material 
correla le of the statement as a whole."" 
Likewise, Hanson understands facts to be neither items in 
the world nor semantic entities like true statements. As Hanson 
writes, "that-clauses are bits of language. Facts, we feel , are 
II TIIB SB)I OLANCS OF IDEOLOGIES ANO SCIENTIFIC THf.OIUES 
something more ... . There is nothing tangible between the 
furniture of the world and our statements nbout the world, 011/y 
that-clauses a,,d facts.''lA 
Although Hanson admits to the elusiven~s of fa~ts, he is 
not shy when it comes to presenting facts. Take, for mstan~, 
his discussion of the members of t he phylum Chordata found m 
Percept/011 a11d D/sco,-ery. One fact about chordates is expressed 
in the following ' that'-clause : 
(I) that they possess a notochord2' 
Although a fact has been expressed to us, it has not been stated. 
Statements arc either true or false, but 'that'-clauses do not 
possess truth value. They arc simply the linguistic medium 
through which facts are presented to us. However, statements 
of fact can be made from ' that'-<:lauses. We can, for example, 
transform (I) into the following statement of fact : 
(2) Chordates possess notochords. 
The result is a statement about a set of objects-the chordates-and 
not n statement about a fact. A fact is, however, stated in (2). 
How do we come to learn that (2) is a statement of fact? 
By an empirical ioquuy. Of course. not every inquiry of this 
kind will support a parficular statement as a statement of fact 
and confirm that a particular 'that'-clause expresses a fact. Io 
the case of chordates, an anatomical investigation of these crea-
tures would allow us to determine whether chordates possess 
notochords. This is not, however, the same as finding some· 
thing under the epidermis that goes by the name of " The fact 
that chordates possess a notochord." Facts are nothing of the 
sort writes Hanson since "facts (are] ... constituted of no more 
tha~ those aspects ~f the world that are expressible in that· 
clauses. There is no more to the fact that chordates ha~e ?oto-
chords than that the world is such that an aspect of it 1s ex-
pressible in the phrase 'that chordates possess notoc~~~s.'' " 26 
Considered in this way, ' that'-clauses project the poss1b1bt1cs of 
linguistic expression into the world, and it is through them that 
the world becomes intelligible. 
It should be clear that facts and language are intimately 
associated with each other. ft is this association, however, that 
underlies the relationship between facts and theories, for Hanson 
writes that "our language, in the form of what we know, ~uts 
an indelible stamp on what we see, and on what we appreciate 
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· as the facts of nature. "27 Assuming that theories are part of 
what we k11ow ab:>Ut nature, it follows that theories leave their 
imprint on observations and facts. Linking facts, language, and 
theories in this way, then, sheds light on his claim that facts do 
not "speak for themselves," but need to be "spoken for."28 
More specifically, we have come to what I call Hanson's Theory-
ladeness of Fact 1hcsis (T J ). This thesis may be presented as 
follows: 
Tl : Theories provide a framework of understanding 
that is needed for "something" to be constituted or appre-
ciated as a fact. 
Let us examine this thesis in greater detail by reviewing Hanson's 
discussion of the nineteenth-century controversy over the na ture 
of light. 
The following question was posed by physicists in the nine-
teenth century: Is the nature of light explained by the undulat?rY. 
or wave theory or is explained by the corpuscular or particle 
· theory? . As Hanson notes, it was generally agreed at that time 
that "light must be either undulatory or corpuscular hut at least 
o11e of these and not both. "29 Entertaining this idea as the central 
assumption of their research, physicists drew L pon their know-
. ledge of wave motion and sought the presence or absence of 
interference phenomena as evidence for deciding between the two 
theories. The most fundamental line of research grew directly 
from the work of Augustin Fresnel (1788-l b27), whose experi-
ments showed the presence of interference, indicated by the 
pattern of light and dark fringes c.n a screen, and thus provided 
experimental evidence ·tor the wave theory of light. 
For Hanson, however, seeing ao interference pattern and 
having factual support for the wave theory are nn one in the 
same. This is because we do not see/acts! We see (and can 
photograph) interference pattern (or patterns of light and dark 
fringes), but we do n<>t see (and cannot photogrnph) fa<;ts. 
This does not mean that facts are any less important. On 
the cootran, facts are integral components of the sc.ientiiic enter-
prise- facts are cited to confirm or disconfirm th~ sorts_ of claims 
that are made by scientists- and as Sllch, figure mto d1seuss1ons 
of our · seeing interference patterns and our acquiring support 
for Lil<! ',\!~Ve theory. As Hanson writes, what 
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persuades us that light is wavelike is the fact that when 
two light beams of identical wave lengths overlap (in phase) 
they interfere to produce a fringe-pattern. It is this fact 
that confirms the hypothesis that light is wavelike, and 
not the fringe-pattern itself. The fringe-pattern is not of 
the right logical type to refute or deny any hypothesis or 
theory. Fringe-pattern just are, like rocks aod blades of 
grass. They are not assertive, hence they cannot confirm 
or deny.30 
While scientific theories serve Lo constitute facts, and, there-
by, statements of fact, at the same time theories also function to 
constitute the sort of observations that play a role in whether a 
factual statement becomes a statement of fact. Thus, from 
Hanson's perspective, viewing bands of light and dark that 
appear on a screen need not mean that the observer sees an 
interference pattern. In a very basic way, we might think of the 
observer's utterances as an indication of what he sees, the basis 
upon which to decide if the observer sees light and dark bands 
or interference patterns. That a person's speech is fundamentally 
an expression of his cognitive fund is basic to the c1aim that 
theory is integrated wiU1 observation, what Hanson refers to as 
the "theory-ladenness of observation. "31 He maintains that 
phenomena, like interference patterns, 
can be appreciated only against a background of at least 
some elementary wave theory, certain general principles 
like that of the rectilinear propagation of light, and probab-
ly a good deal of experience with the characteristics of 
water waves and sound waves. A very young child, whose 
vision is every bit as good as ours, wi ll not see interference 
fringes or diffraction patterns. He will see alternate bands 
of light and dark- and that is all. And that is the sub-
stance of our own visual impression too, though for us it 
is a sophisticated visual experience. We see interference 
and diffraction ... . The significance we will attach to an 
observation is pretty largely a reflection of what we have 
been trained to regard as significant, which is just a way 
of saying that we see every new experience only through 
the lens of the knowledge we already possess. 32 
Since the "conceptual repertoire" of the child differs greatly 
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from that of the physicist- it Jacks the prerequisite concepts 
that would allow the child to see the interference patterns that 
are so commonplace for the physicist- it is small wonder that 
the child sees only allernnle bands of light and dark. 
The theory-ladenness of observation thus is consistent with 
the idea that our " lens of knowledge" or conceptual repertoire" 
is involved in the consititution or appreciation of facts. The 
young child, who Jacks the conceptual repertoire of the physicist, 
will not only be unable to see certain things and events, but the 
child will also be unable 10 come to terms with the facts that 
support the wave theory. Indeed, bow could a child appreciate 
the fact that "when two light beams of identical wave lengths 
overlap (in phase) they interfere to produce a fringe-pattern." 
Moreover, if the child is unable to appreciate 1he facts 1hat favor 
1he wave theory, then he will face the additional disadvantage 
of being unable to draw inferences from those facts. So until 
the child acquires some of the conceptual apparatus of the 
physicist, he will be doomed to speak in 1crms of alternate bands 
of light and dark. 
But to say that the inahility to appreciate certnin facts is 
confined solely to children, is to te deluded of the grounds of 
the scientific experience. While it is , ·cry likely that children 
will have difficulty grasping scientilic facts, it may not t e an 
experience that is peculiar to children. Indeed, it is likely that 
scientists experience the same problem. Just imagine, for 
instance, how dumbfounded Fresnel would have teen if he wit-
nessed the Compton X-ray scauering experiments. Unprepared 
to deal with the advances made by twentieth-century scientis1s, 
Fresnel would have been unable {al least before he became 
acquainted with the physics of our time) to appreciate the streaks 
in a Wilson chamber as the "constituents of facts" that support 
the particle theory of light. Thus, neither the child nor the 
scientists can grapple with the facts of the Fresoel-Youngexperi· 
ments or the Compton experiments unless he has some under-
standing lo the theory oflight as wavelike or particlelike respec-
tively. Such facts, so the adage goes, "need to be spoken for", 
for their cons1itution or appreciation occurs only by means of 
acquiring the relevant conceptual apparatus. Or, as Hanson 
puts it so succinctly, " Nothing can constitute a fact unless 
1111derstood i11 terms of some theory. "l2 Theories thus help us 
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to make sense of the world by allowing us to ct'me to terms with 
facts. 
P ART Ill : I OEOLOC1t:s ANO FACTS 
But can the same be said of ideologies? Do ideolories have 
such a constitutional fc.ature ? I believe they do. Of the two 
elements of ideoloJ!Y, the idcational clement proved to 1:e the 
significant point of contact and between ideology and scientific 
theory. Although much was made of ideology teing a coherent 
and subs1antive system of ideas that offers a view of how reolity 
ought to be, this normative function must not overshadow its 
conceptualization of "the contours of reality" as it is. If we 
acknowledge that ideology h2s a cosnitive role to play in assist· 
ing us in making sense of the world that we live in, then we 
have little choice but to modify Tl in order to recognize the 
contribution of ideologies in the constitution of certain facts. 
One need only recall the ' that'-clause of Chomsky's that I cited 
in Part One to get a sense of the sort of facts that are constituted 
by ideologies and that come to lhc forefront of ideological dis• 
pules. The new thesis, then, can 1,e rend in the following woy: 
T2 : Ideologies provide a framework of understanding that 
is needed for " something" to be constituted or appre-
ciated as a fact. 
Both science and ideology allow us to live in a world that is 
meaningful, a world in which we recognize certain items as 
facts. In reference to science, this statement is beyond question. 
However, Tl asserted lhe theory-ladenness of fact as if it were 
confined strictly to matters of science. To the extent that ideo-
logies contribute meaning, the thesis cannot be res1ricted in this 
way. To argue, as Huntington does, that ideologies are no 
longer the prime movers of global politics, is a bit premature, 
for it is to imply that either ideologies have suddenly and 
mysteriously lost their capability to make such a contribution 
and, tl1U~, no longer constitute facts, or their contribution is 
one that is no longer accepted by those who once took ideologies 
to be the guiding light of politics. To sug&est the former is to 
take lightl~ the. se~sc-making quality that ideolories have in 
common with. sc1cnt1fic theories; to argue the latter is a legiti· 
mate ~onte.nt.JOn, but ?ne that needs to be explored with !great 
care, since 1t 1s not obvious why after so many years "clashes of 
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ideologies" have been replaced with " clashes of civilizations." 
But wha1ever the case, the fcrmulation T2, \\ilh all its conse-
quences for Huntington's thesis, [etms 10 te one that we must 
acknowledge. O 
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